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Coalition and Hegemony: Religion’s Role in the Progress 
of Modernization in Reformed China 
Zeng Chuanhui

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past thirty-two years, mainland China has risen from one of 
the poorest countries to the second largest economic power in the world.1 
The sweeping but stable progress of modernization in China may be 
listed among the most important events in human history.2 What are the 
proper cultural factors contributing to this marvel? What is the role of 
religion in this progress? 
According to Max Weber, the Protestant ethic was coincident with 
the rise of capitalism in Europe.
3
 Protestantism is obviously irrelevant to 
the situation in China because Protestants are still a very small minority 
to this day,4 and Calvinistic ethic has little influence there. 
During the 1970s and 80s when “the four little dragons in East 
Asia”—Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea—took the lead in 
modernization in Asia, many Neo-Confucian scholars ascribed the great 
success to Confucian morality, which still somewhat influences the 
cultural mores of these countries. China was the cradle of Confucianism 
and, of course, has been traditionally regarded as the major enclave of 
Confucian culture. Nevertheless, Confucianism has been criticized and 
rejected by mainstream intellectuals as an opponent to modernity since 
 
 .  Associate Professor and Department Chair, Department of Marxist Theories on Religion, 
Institute of World Religions, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). 
 1. James Altucher, There’s No Stopping China, NEW YORK POST, Aug. 1, 2010, 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/there_no_stopping_china_0H8GJaMgzHCYenL038Yh2N.  
 2. SUISHENG ZHAO, CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: PRAGMATISM AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 
248 (2004).  
 3.  See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 
(Talcott Parsons trans., Dover Publ’ns 2003) (1958).   
 4. According to the census data conducted by our institute, in 2009 about 1.8% of the 
population in mainland China declared themselves as Protestants. See also Anthony Lam, A Review 
of the Development of Christianity in China from the Latest Edition of Blue Book of Religions 
(2010), 159 TRIPOD 54 (2010) (“In China, Protestants make up about 1.8 percent of the total 
population.” (citing THE CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, BLUE BOOK OF RELIGIONS 191 
(2010))).  
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the May Fourth Movement in 1919.5 After the Chinese Communist Party 
(“CCP”) came into power in 1949, and especially during the Cultural 
Revolution, Confucianism was treated as one of the “putrescent” cultures 
that should be thrown away “into the trash pile of history.”6 In the past 
several years, conditions have changed only slightly, but the government 
and some intellectuals are trying to make use of Confucian morality to 
help rebuild social order. The voices of neo-Confucianism are just 
beginning to echo from the studies of scholars. 
Are the above observations sufficient for us to conclude that religion 
has been basically absent from the modernization of reformed China? 
How can we properly evaluate the role of religion in that country? This 
Article briefly examines these questions. Part II discusses China’s system 
of elite governance and how it has become more open to religion. Part III 
examines religion’s influence on China’s developing culture. Finally, 
Part IV discusses sources of domestic and foreign resistance to China’s 
changing hegemony. 
II. RELIGION PLAYS A PART IN THE ELITE COALITION 
A. The Elitist Governance 
The Chinese government claims that China is a socialist country, but 
its version of socialism is fundamentally different from the traditional 
sense in that (1) it totally embraces the market economy, which was 
purported to be one of the lethal factors of capitalism; (2) most of the 
state-owned enterprises have been privatized; and (3) the disparity in the 
distribution of wealth in China today is among the greatest in the world.7 
 
 5. See KAI-WING CHOW, BEYOND THE MAY FOURTH PARADIGM: IN SEARCH OF CHINESE 
MODERNITY 162 (2008).  
 6. See WILLIAM THEODORE DE BARY & WEI-MING TU, CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 253 (1998). There were many popular slogans during the Cultural Revolution, such as 
“Demolish the Four Olds,” which referred to the old thinking, old culture, old customs and old 
habits, and “Sweep all the putrescent feudalist, capitalist and revisionist contrabands into the trash 
pile of history with the iron besom of proletariat.” “The feudalist contrabands” refers particularly to 
the cultures from China itself before the ruling of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); “the 
capitalist contrabands” refers to those from the western countries; and the “revisionist contrabands” 
refers to those from the Soviet Union. See also Editorial, Sweep Up  
All Kinds of Ox Monsters and Snake Demons（横扫一切牛鬼蛇神),  PEOPLE’S DAILY, June 1, 1966 
(later labeled as the “Declaration of the Cultural Revolution”); Red Guards from the Middle School 
Attached to Tsinghua University, Long Live the Revolutionary Rebelling Spirit of the Proletariat 
(无产阶级的革命造反精神万岁), 37 PEKING REVIEW 20, 20–21, Sept. 9, 1966, available at 
http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1966/PR1966-37p.htm (commended by 
Chairman Mao, published in Red Flag Journal, and labeled the “Declaration of Red Guards”).  
 7. BJÖRN GUSTAFSSON, SHI LI & TERRY SICULAR, INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY IN 
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According to traditional Marxism, public ownership and distribution of 
goods in proportion to work are two basic standards of socialism.8 In 
today’s China, state ownership and collective ownership have been 
transformed in favor of joint-stock ownership.9 Social wealth has 
become more and more concentrated in the holdings of a small 
percentage of the population. In 2008, the Gini coefficient was around 
.469,10 approaching an alarming level. 
Thus China no longer has a socialist system, at least in the traditional 
sense. Nor does it have a capitalist system. The major difference between 
the system of China and that of other Western capitalist countries is the 
system of governance. The Chinese people have not voted to select their 
president directly. This does not mean that there is no democracy at all, 
or that the Chinese government 
 
lacks legitimacy. China’s special way of governance and the 
government’s high efficiency have supported its legitimacy. 
Some scholars of politics named this system of governance “neo-
 
CHINA 118–144 (2008).  
 8. See generally ADRIAN CHAN, CHINESE MARXISM (2003).  
 9. The ownership reform of state corporations started in the mid-1990s. The state 
corporations have been reorganized as limited or joint-stock companies. The methods of reform are 
diverse and include combination, annexation, leasing, responsibility contract, alienation, bankruptcy, 
and, of course, joint-stock. The reform proposals are made or approved by the parent units who 
control the ownership. The goal of reform is to establish the modern company system, which allows 
the executive agency independence in day-to-day decision making involving production, hiring, and 
contracts with other businesses. In most cases, the management of the reformed companies evolved 
to become the major stockholders. By 2005, most state corporations were privatized. For example, in 
the three provinces in Northeast China (Manchuria) where state corporations used to flourish, 62.5% 
of large industrial corporations were reformed, and in Liaoning Province, state ownership fell below 
50%. All province or county-controlled ownerships were transformed in Jilin Province, including the 
carving up of 90% of 3,000 midsized and small state corporations and 85% of the large corporations. 
As a result, a significant number of private companies are formerly state-owned. In a sample test 
conducted in 2002, 25.7% of private companies used to be state-owned or collectively owned all 
around China. In East China, this figure is even higher, up to 45.6%. See Report by Gao Liang, 
Director of the Center for State-Owned Property Under the National Development and Reform 
Commission, SCIENCE NETWORK (Nov. 20, 2007, 10:49 AM), 
http://bbs.sciencenet.cn/home.php?mod=space&uid=2862&do=blog&id=11346; see also George 
Tseo et al., The Reform of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Through Employee Ownership of 
Stock and Participation in Management 1–2 (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://cog.kent.edu/lib/TseoPeng-zhuLihai.pdf.  
 10. ROGER A. ARNOLD, ECONOMICS 578 (2005). The Gini coefficient is a measure of 
inequality of a distribution developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini in 1912. It is often used 
to measure income inequality. It is a number between zero and one, where zero corresponds to 
perfect equality (e.g. everyone has the same income) and one corresponds to perfect inequality (e.g. 
one person has all the income and everyone else has zero income). 
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authoritarianism,” which was quite popular in the 1980s through the 
early 1990s.11 As to rampant corruption, some scholars called it crony 
capitalism, but I prefer to characterize it as elite governance. I do not 
adopt the term “elitism” because it has multivocal and derogatory 
meanings. The elite governance I refer to in this Article is the style of 
political practice in reformed China, which implies that the government 
rules with the cooperation of select groups whose members can claim 
great achievements, widespread social influence, or a high level of 
specialized training. The gist of elite governance in the Chinese context 
is often expressed as a popular slogan: “Experts manage state affairs” 
(Zhuan jia zhi guo).12 Accordingly, most of the “third generation leading 
group”13 headed by Jiang Zemin and the “Hu-Wen leading group”14 had 
technocratic backgrounds. This occurred partly because technocrats are 
better at accumulating good performances and hence get promoted faster 
in an economy-centered era.15 It was also partly an intentional selection 
because Deng Xiaoping, the leader of the CCP, and his think tank 
adopted a strategy of technocracy.16 This strategy successfully avoided 
 
 11. In the early period of reform, Chinese people were concentrated on the disenchantment 
from the deified leadership of Chairman Mao, but soon after the nation became ideologically 
confused. The expansive power of local governments presented a significant challenge to the 
authority of the central government. In fact, some intellectuals and high officials were eager to 
introduce radical political reform, which resulted in more social turmoil. These intellectuals and 
officials included Fang Lizhi (方励之), former professor and president of the University of Science 
and Technology of China, Yan Jiaqi (严家其), former professor and director of the Institute of 
Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Hu Yaobang, the former sectary-general of the 
CCP. In response, Mr. Deng Xiaoping repeatedly stressed authority. He drew a new road map: 
strong authority of the ruling party, where the CCP and leading groups would secure social order, 
make government efficient, and cushion market-oriented, economical reform. Some scholars, like 
Xiao Gongqin (萧功秦), professor at Shanghai Jiaotong University, Wu Jiaxiang (吴稼样), then a 
staff member of the Central Committee’s Research Department and now a freelance writer, and 
Zhang Binjiu (张炳九), professor at Peking University, adapted the neo-authoritarian theory to this 
situation. See AN INTRODUCTION TO NEO-AUTHORITARIANISM, 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/2290869.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2011); see also TAKASHI INOGUCHI & 
MATTHEW CARLSON, GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY IN ASIA 144 (2006).  
 12. ZHIDONG HAO, INTELLECTUALS AT A CROSSROADS 227 (2003). 
 13. This phrase refers to the generation of party leaders during current President Hu Jintao’s 
presidency. 
 14. See JOHN WONG & HONGYI LAI, CHINA INTO THE HU-WEN ERA: POLICY INITIATIVES 
AND CHALLENGES 7 (2006).  
 15. Id.  
 16. Kaiser Kuo, Made in China: The Revenge of the Nerds, TIME, June 27, 2001, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,165453,00.html. This strategy of selecting leaders 
with science and technology backgrounds results in a different leadership dynamic than that of many 
Western countries such as the United States, where most political leaders have legal or social science 
backgrounds. 
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the waste caused by rifts between the leftist vis-à-vis rightist ideologies 
and cushioned the implementation of pragmatism. The technocracy, with 
the cooperation of elites from other circles, formed a distinctive elite 
governance. 
Elite governance differs from neo-authoritarianism in that it accepts 
low political involvement from the grass roots but does not exclude 
them.17 It lurches, though cautiously, towards universal suffrage; it is not 
tantamount to cronyism in that it demonstrates strong will, tries to 
determine the best way to fight against corruption and disparity, and 
allows vertical social mobility. 
After the Tiananmen Square Movement in 1989, the Chinese 
government launched a nationwide reindoctrination and rectification 
movement to reestablish its authority on the one hand, and insisted on the 
implementation of reform strategies on the other.18 The policies, most of 
which had been designed by the former leading group stagnated under 
the radical movement in 1989 but were realized under the powerful 
endorsement and resuscitation of the late paramount leader Deng 
Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in the early spring of 1992.19 The governing 
Party has addressed the economic interests of the business elites by 
adopting a joint-stock system and has focused on shared ideology and 
decision making with the intellectual elites.20 There is also more 
separation among the various functions of party, government, business, 
and education. Other improvements include a more independent 
judiciary system and a more professional civil service.21 It is true that the 
Party today still controls the appointment of top officials at every level, 
and top officials hold concurrent posts of both party and administration 
in many cases, but the Party and the government are far less involved in 
day-to-day management (except, of course, in sensitive political areas). 
Experiments with the election of village leaders by universal voting have 
been extended throughout the countryside.22 In some places, elections to 
 
 17. See generally INOGUCHI & CARLSON, supra note 11.  
 18. See generally YIJIANG DING, CHINESE DEMOCRACY AFTER TIANANMEN (2001).  
 19. JAMES A. R. MILES, THE LEGACY OF TIANANMEN: CHINA IN DISARRAY 88 (1997). 
Following the Tiananmen Square Movement, Deng Xiaoping toured several southern provinces to 
encourage continued economic reform but not political reform.  
 20. See generally JUAN ANTONIO FERNÁNDEZ & LEILA FERNÁNDEZ-STEMBRIDGE, CHINA’S 
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS: AN INDUSTRIAL AND CEO APPROACH (2007).  
 21. See generally Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China’s Judicial Reform, 
4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 255 (2003). 
 22. Dingjian Cai, The Development of Constitutionalism in the Transition of Chinese Society, 
19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 18–19 (2005). 
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local legislatures have become more democratic, allowing independent 
candidates.23 In 2002, the Party revised its charter in order to reflect the 
growth of a new bourgeoisie and allowed private entrepreneurs to join 
the Party. And the Party has recently encouraged greater public 
involvement in the drafting of some local legislation by holding open 
hearings.24 It was reported that more than 5,000 experts from all walks of 
life participated in the drafting of The Eleventh Five-Year Plan, which 
was passed by the national congress in June 2006.25 
B. The Return and Development of the United Front Policy 
In 1978, with the ascension of Deng Xiaoping to power and the 
introduction of a profound reform program, party leaders also reached a 
consensus that they must shift the role of the party from revolution to 
governing and bring back the United Front policy—the coalition 
strategy.26 In October 1978, the Central Committee issued a document to 
“address two emergent questions on religious work,” which were (1) to 
“distinguish the two contradictions with different natures”27 and 
“earnestly and roundly implement the constitution’s article dealing with 
the freedom of religious belief,” and (2) to return a few venues for open 
worship.28 This document initiated a journey to bring religious 
organizations into the new coalition. In the next year, the Central 
Committee once again approved its United Front Work Department’s 
(UFWD) request for abolishing the “hat of capitulationism”29 put on the 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Richard J. Ferris Jr. & Hongjun Zhang, The Challenges of Reforming an 
Environmental Legal Culture: Assessing the Status Quo and Looking at Post-WTO Admission 
Challenges for the People’s Republic of China, 14 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 429, 445–46 (2002). 
 25. For reports on the independent legislature candidates, which captured much public 
attention, see Shenzhen Futian District People’s Congress General Elections, CHINA YOUTH (May 
21, 2003, 2:25 AM), http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2003-05/21/content_ 666412.htm. Some earlier 
independent cases occurred even in the 1980s and 1990s, but few people paid attention to them. See 
Shenzhen’s Wang Liang is Not the “First Independent Candidate,” CLUB.KDNET.Net (May 26, 
2003, 8:59 AM), http://club.kdnet.net/ dispbbs.asp?boardid=2&id=597224&page=1#597224. 
 26. See George Finch, Modern Chinese Constitutionalism: Reflections of Economic Change, 
15 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 75, 92–93 (2007). 
 27. This refers to the sometimes inconsistent characteristics of religion. 
 28. In October 1978, the Central Committee of the CCP forwarded a report from the Central 
United Front Work Department of the CCP. The name of the report was Urgent Need to Address 
Two Current Religious Policy-Related Issues. This file is one of the files possessed by the Central 
United Front Work Department of the CCP.  
 29. “Capitulationism,” from the word “capitulant,” refers to thoughts or behaviors that harm 
national or class interests and surrender to the enemy or another country. The “hat” here is actually 
the abbreviated name for a “clown’s long hat,” which was a tall conical paper hat filled with large 
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heads of the organs of the united front, ethnic and religious work during 
the Cultural Revolution throughout the country.30 This actually was a 
formal top-down purge, which was part of the new coalition strategy. 
This purge cleared the way for religious participation in public life. 
Nevertheless, the new coalition strategy encountered much resistance 
from the “leftists” in the early post-Maoist era, which required a more 
sophisticated ideological justification. In September 1979, Deng 
Xiaoping gave an order to legalize ethnic and religious policies.31 In the 
coming years, Hu Yaobang, the late general secretary of the CCP, 
presided personally over attempts to articulate a new set of policies 
acceptable to all the political viewpoints in that period. In March 1982, 
the Central Committee issued the well-known Document 19,32 which 
today is still the working guideline and theoretical foundation for the 
CCP in dealing with religious affairs.33 It highlighted from a Marxist 
viewpoint that religion is a historical-social phenomenon, meaning that 
religion is not only a kind of ideology but also an important social force, 
and has a natural process of origination, development, and death.34 It 
stressed the five characteristics of religion—longevity, popularity, ethnic 
diversity, international appeal, and complex nature—which were 
articulated in the 1950s by Li Weihan, a late director of central UFWD.35 
These five characteristics were later reduced to the three 
characteristics—longevity, popularity and complex nature—in 2002 by 
Ye Xiaowen, the present director of the State Administration of 
Religious Affairs (SARA).36 This theoretical formulation led to the 
conclusion that the freedom of religious practice should not be a policy 
 
characters spouting insulting labels and put on the head of a “bad element” at a denunciation 
conference during the Cultural Revolution. In the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards put the label 
of capitulationism（投降主义） on the United Front Work and stopped it.  
 30. In 1979, a report filed by the Central United Front Work Department of the Chinese 
Communist Party was approved. The name of the report was A Request for Abolishing the Hat of 
Capitulationism of All United Front, Ethnic, and Religious Work Through the Country. 
 31. DENG XIAOPING’S COMMENTS ON UNITED FRONT WORK 161 (1991). 
 32. In 1982, the Central Committee of CCP published Document Number 19. The name of 
the document was The Basic Opinion and Policy of Religious Issues During the Period of Socialism 
in China. An English translation can be found in DONALD E. MACINNIS, RELIGION IN CHINA 
TODAY: POLICY AND PRACTICE 8-26 (1989). 
 33. See Lawrence Cox, Freedom of Religion in China: Religious, Economic and Social 
Disenfranchisement for China’s Internal Migrant Workers, 8 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 370, 374 
(2007). 
 34. Id. 
 35. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, CHINA: STATE CONTROL OF RELIGION 117 (1997). 
 36. Ye Xiaowen, Socialist Religions, 5 QIU SHI (求是) (2003), available at 
http://www.dingan.gov.cn/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=954.  
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of expedience but must be guided and supervised under laws and 
regulations. 
When the third generation leading group came to power in 1992, 
some subtle changes had taken place in the religious situation in China: 
most religious properties that could be returned had been handed over to 
the respective religious organizations, the focus of religious affairs had 
switched to daily coordination and supervision, the religious “boom” 
enabled temples and churches to play a larger role in society, the former 
socialist countries had imploded, China had entered the WTO, and China 
was more deeply involved in globalization. All of these developments 
ushered in a whole new range of challenges.37 In November 1993, 
President Jiang Zemin’s address at the National United Front Work 
Conference38 updated the CCP’s views. The address was later condensed 
into the “four phrases,” the last of which was appended to Jiang Zemin’s 
report at the Sixteenth Party Congress held in November 2002.39 The 
four phases are: (1) implement the Party’s religious policy thoroughly; 
(2) administer the religious affairs according to the law; (3) positively 
guide the mutual adaptation between religion and socialist society; and 
(4) insist on the principle of independence and self-administration.40 
C. Religious Organizations’ Involvement in the Elite Coalition 
With the implementation of the new policies, all of the five major 
religions—Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism—
have enjoyed three decades of growth and have multiplied their 
memberships and properties.41 According to the government’s 
incomplete statistics, in 2004 there were over 100 million religious 
 
 37. See generally, Kim-Kwong Chan, China’s Socioeconomic Changes and the Implications 
for the Religion-State Dynamic in China, 2004 BYU L. REV. 325. 
 38. The reliable full text of the document can be found on some government websites.  
 39. Jiang Zemin, Build a Well-Off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation 
in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (Nov. 8, 2002), http://www.china-
un.ch/eng/ljzg/smwx/t85795.htm (unofficial English version of the report delivered at the 16th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China).  
 40. Id. at V.1. The Chinese text of the four phases is: “全面贯彻党的宗教信仰自由政 策, 
依法管理宗教事务, 积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应, 坚持独立自主自办的原则.” 
 41. Cf. Chan, supra note 37, at 334–35 (“The growth in religion includes the officially 
sanctioned faiths, such as Christianity and Buddhism, as well as . . . unsanctioned religious sects 
. . . .”); Ian Johnson, The Rise of the Tao, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/magazine/07religion-t.html?pagewanted=all# (“It is impossible 
to miss the religious building boom, with churches, temples and mosques dotting areas where none 
existed a few years ago.”). 
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followers,42 more than 110,000 religious venues, some 330,000 religious 
personnel, and at least 74 religious schools throughout China. This 
included 8 million laypersons, 4,000 clergy, and over 4,600 venues 
affiliated with Catholicism. Over 16 million lay persons, some 18,000 
clergy, and 37,000 churches and temporary venues belonged to 
Protestant religions. Since the 1980s, approximately 600 Protestant 
churches have been reopened or newly organized each year in China; 
through 1995 to 2004, the annual increase rate of Protestants was above 
5%.43 In 2009, the Institute of World Religions conducted a large-scale 
sampling of 63,680 questionnaires from 2,718 villages and communities 
in 321 counties. The results indicate that there are 23 million Protestants 
in China.44 
This religious “boom” cost all levels of government substantial 
energy and money to vacate occupants from temples and churches and 
transplant residences for planned new religious buildings. The 
government also provided subsidies to repair and maintain the old 
religious buildings that were declared cultural relics. In 2002, for 
example, the central government appropriated 330 million yuan ($46 
million) for the second-stage rehabilitation of the three famous ancient 
lamasery compounds in Tibet (Potala, Norbuglinkha, and Sagya). These 
repairs were actually completed seven years later at a much higher price 
of 380 million yuan.45 In some cases the government also reimbursed 
needy religious organizations for operating expenses. This financial 
 
 42. Johnson, supra note 41 (noting that previous surveys showed 100 million religious 
followers and more recent surveys suggest there are around 300 million religious followers). 
 43. These data came from the Central UFWD’s statistics in 2004. The annual increase rate is 
calculated by the author. The statistics are collected down-up through the governmental hierarchy 
and are restricted to a very small circle without public availability. Nevertheless, a slightly earlier 
version of similar numbers was announced in October 1997 in the bilingual white paper Freedom of 
Religious Belief in China, available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zjxy/t36492.htm. 
According to SARA, the Protestant believers numbered 10.57 million in 1995, and 16 million by the 
end of 2003. The equation is: 10.57×（1+x）8=16 (million). The resolution is 0.532. Thus, the 
annual rate is above 5%. 
 44. RELIGION BLUE BOOK: CHINESE RELIGION REPORT (2010) 190–212 (Jin Ze & Qiu 
Yonghui eds., 2011); see also Survey: Over 23 Million Christians in China, 9 CHINA LINKS NEWSL. 
46 (Aug.–Sept. 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/links/china/docs/ aug_sept_2010.pdf. 
 45. Potala Palace, Norbulingka and Sakya Monastery Maintenance Works Started for Three 
Key Cultural Relics Protection, CCTV.COM (June 26, 2002, 8:34 PM) 
http://www.cctv.com/news/xwlb/20020626/345.html; Potala Palace, Norbulingka and Sakya 
Monastery Maintenance Works Completed Three Major Cultural Relics, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY 
(Aug. 23, 2009, 10:47 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-08/23/content_11932451.htm; 
see also Jing Xiaolei, Investing in Tibet’s Culture, BEIJING REV., 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/200805/04/content_114130.htm (last updated May 4, 2008). 
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support enables religions to share in public prosperity and greatly 
consolidates the foundation of the elite coalition. 
There are some conduits for religions to share power, ideas, and 
honor with public authorities. Religious personalities, having recovered 
from the injustices they suffered during the Cultural Revolution, became 
saint-like figures in their respective religions. As a result, thousands of 
younger persons have graduated from religious schools and become 
clergy, and many religious students who studied abroad have come back 
to serve their flocks.46 Thousands of these religious leaders have 
ascended to be members of the gradually expanding elite coalition, the 
major organizations of which are the congresses, political consultant 
committees, and youth leagues at the national, provincial, municipal, and 
county levels. This provides an active and efficient way to represent the 
voices of the believers and  
 
provides them a way to participate in the decision making, supervision, 
and policy-improving processes. 
These coalition members are selected rather than elected. The 
selection procedure is confusing to outsiders and varies by zone, 
organization, and time period. The general pattern seems to be that the 
inner circle of one religious organization determines and submits the 
candidates to the related government and party organs—religious affairs 
bureaus, United Front Work Departments, congresses, or committees—
for approval. Although the public opinion and reputations of the 
candidates are important variables for consideration, recognition within 
the elite groups plays a more direct role in the selection process. 
III. THE ADAPTATION AND CONTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS CULTURE TO 
THE GESTATING CULTURAL HEGEMONY 
A. Challenges that Have Prompted Remolding the Cultural Hegemony 
There are certainly cultural factors behind Chinese success. Unlike 
European countries, North America, and “the four little dragons in East 
 
 46. The national statistics of graduates from the religious schools are not accessible, but some 
local governments have published their numbers. For example, the five religious schools in Shanghai 
Municipality have trained more than 1,000 graduates since the 1980s. Details are available at the 
Shanghai government website:  http://www.shmzw.gov.cn/gb/mzw/shzj/ zjyx/index.html. See also 
INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FREEDOM OF 
RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN CHINA, at IV (Oct. 1997), available at http://sa.china-
embassy.org/eng/zt/zfbps/t154430.htm. 
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Asia,” modern China has no dominant religious culture. The functioning 
cultural elements that have facilitated the fast growth of the reform era 
are the harmonious cultural bonds, which are a product of China’s long 
history. The people share a common national language, ethno-
psychology, and customs. No religious background can be found in the 
existent political system. Laws may be incomplete but are quite simple 
and practical. The governing party sticks to Marxism as its leading 
ideology, and keeps honing new discourses and propagating new ideas to 
shape the national mindset. Therefore, it is easy for the government to 
reach agreement, and the execution of new ideas encounters low 
resistance. 
This way of governance successfully holds mainland China in a 
monolithic configuration, but the legitimacy of the dominant ideology 
has faced great challenges in the post-Cold War years; tension between 
the ideal and social reality is becoming ever more salient. When 
confronted with sensitive questions, such as the yawning disparity 
between the rich and poor, human rights, democracy, freedom, and 
openness, the government often has no  
 
 
consistent theories with which to defend itself, regardless of whether the 
charges come from home or abroad.47 
The post-Cold War global situation has also given the Chinese elite a 
tug. While the vocal discussions on Samuel Huntington’s theory on the 
conflicts of civilizations rippled through the nation,48 the Kosovo and 
Iraq Wars, the September 11, 2001 incident, and the Color Revolutions 
in the former Soviet Union states made the Chinese elite think more 
deeply on how culture matters, even though they might not agree with 
Huntington’s conclusions. 
B. Antonio Gramsci’s Theory of Cultural Hegemony 
In 1992, Selected Writings by Gramsci was translated by the Central 
Compilation and Translation Bureau and published by Renmin Press.49 
Antonio Gramsci was a founder of the Communist movement in Italy. 
 
 47. See Bryan Edelman & James T. Richardson, Falun Gong and the Law: Development of 
Legal Social Control in China, 6 NOVA RELIGIO: J. ALTERNATIVE & EMERGENT RELIGIONS 312, 
326–27 (2003). 
 48. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1993). 
 49. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTED WRITINGS (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau 
trans., Renmin Press 1992). 
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He spent a lot of energy discussing issues affecting Marxist theory in his 
Prison Notebooks after the worldwide economic depression of the early 
1930s, when Marxism failed to materialize in the most advanced 
capitalist nations.50 Although Marxism did not become widespread, it 
was not defeated either. Capitalist governments managed to survive the 
economic and political crisis and stabilize themselves by making 
socialist compromises and transformations. This situation created the 
need for new theories to explain the extraordinary resilience of 
capitalism and for new strategies different from those that had worked in 
Russia. Gramsci’s theory was developed in opposition to Idealist 
philosophers, represented by Benedetto Croce,51 and to the mechanist 
materialists, represented by Karl Kautsky,52 as well as other theorists of 
the Second International.53 Gramsci opposed Kautsky’s idea of political 
inactivity, which proposed that the lower classes wait passively for the 
“objective moment” when the crises of capitalism produces system 
collapse, but he agreed with Lenin and Luxemburg that class struggle 
could create conditions for socialist revolution. He especially 
emphasized cultural struggle, which resembles Croceanism to some 
degree.54 To develop this cultural struggle, he put the concept of cultural 
hegemony at the center of his vast and loose network of ideas. 
What is most interesting to contemporary Chinese intellectuals is 
Gramsci’s departure from the definition of hegemony, which was widely 
accepted to be a strategy of political leadership that was based upon a 
 
 50. See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, Americanism and Fordism, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON 
NOTEBOOKS 277 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., trans., 1971). 
 51. Widely regarded as the “foremost Italian philosopher of the first half of the 20th 
century,” Croce thoroughly studied and eventually rejected Marxism before founding La Critica, “a 
journal of cultural criticism, in which . . . he published nearly all his writings and reviewed all of the 
most important historical, philosophical, and literary work that was being produced in Europe at the 
time.” A. Robert Caponigri, Benedetto Croce, BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/143635/Benedetto-Croce# (last visited Sept. 4, 2011).  
 52. A leading Marxist theorist during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Kautsky’s writings made him “largely responsible for Marxism’s early spread.” Kautsky, Karl, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Karl_Johann_Kautsky.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 4, 2011). For Kautsky’s view on materialism, see KARL KAUTSKY, ETHICS AND THE 
MATERIALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY (John B. Askew trans., 1906), available at 
http://snap3.uas.mx/RECURSO1/pensamiento%20economico/LECTURAS%20HISTORIA%20DEL
%20PENSAMIENTO%20ECON%E0MICO.%20INGL%90S/Kautsky.%20Ethics%20and%20the%
20Materialist%20Conception%20of%20History.pdf. 
 53. See GRAMSCI, supra note 50, at 343 n.28. 
 54. Id. at xxiii (noting that Gramsci critiqued Crocean philosophy’s reduction of the “struggle 
of opposites to a merely conceptual dialectic” because it inadequately addressed the “real conflicts” 
inherent in a class society). 
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fundamental alliance with the peasantry (Lenin and Mao). He articulated 
that it is not the economic foundation that determines power structure 
directly, but rather cultural hegemony. His version of Marxism 
repudiates linear and mechanistic thinking, which reduces culture and 
ideas, including religion, to direct, passive reflections of economic 
forces. He views culture as a semiautonomous sphere of society that 
plays an important mediating role in the totality of social life. Revolution 
struggle, for Gramsci, is ultimately a matter of education. Education in 
Italy at that time was still a rigidly bourgeois affair. In his view, the 
lower classes must generate their own “organic intellectuals”55 capable 
of creating new forms of hegemony by shattering the universalistic 
claims of old worldviews. These organic intellectuals can function within 
the ranks of a social stratum or class in an educative or leadership role in 
association with trade unions, workers’ councils, and especially political 
parties.56 The professionals—such as managers, engineers, advertisers, 
scholars, and journalists—are the organic intellectuals of bourgeoisie, but 
clergy are not organic to either the proletariat or bourgeoisie. They are 
traditional intellectuals who appear to serve universal values, but whose 
careers, regardless of their class of origin, are tied to the church, which is 
rooted in earlier social formations such as feudalism.57 Thus, Gramsci 
shares the common Marxist view that religion is the residue of past time, 
but he provides a more concrete analysis. For Gramsci, religion never 
exists without conflicting with ideas that express the “protest of the 
oppressed.” The example is popular religion, which is a conception of 
life and the world that, on many points, conflicts with official 
conceptions of the world. “Every religion . . . is in reality a multiplicity 
of distinct and often contradictory religions” that vary along class lines.58 
Gramsci even believed that popular religion in Italy was, at best, a source 
of passive resistance. 
Furthermore, Gramsci extended hegemony to include the bourgeoisie 
as well as other social classes. Although one class would inevitably 
become the hegemonic class, this view “presupposes that account be 
taken of the interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony 
is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be 
formed.”59 In other words, the dominant class will not only exert a 
 
 55. Id. at 3. 
 56. Id. at 3–4. 
 57. Id. at 22 
 58. Id. at 420. 
 59. Id. at 161; ANTONIO GRAMSCI, Hegemony, Relations of Force, Historical Bloc, in AN 
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moral-intellectual leadership but will also go beyond its own “economic-
corporate” interests in order to ally itself within a social bloc of forces (a 
historical bloc) that represents a basis of compromise and consent.60 In a 
sense, he supposed that the triumphant group was evolving to represent 
the universal advancement of society beyond the pitfalls of capitalism. 
This moral and intellectual leadership in hegemony is Gramsci’s addition 
to Lenin’s views. 
There are two ways a class can become hegemonic: transformation 
and expansion. Transformation is how the Moderate Party of 
Risorgimento won forces for unification.61 A gradual but continuous 
absorption, even of antagonistic groups, resulted in a bastard hegemony, 
merely passive consensus, the neutralization of the masses, and a 
“passive revolution.”62 Expansive hegemony operates by means of active 
consensus, the adoption of popular interests by the hegemonic class, and 
the creation of “national-popular will.”63 Only a fundamental class 
(which occupies one of the two poles in relations of production) can 
become hegemonic, as hegemony is ethico-political and economic. 
Sooner or later, the bourgeoisie comes up against limits of its hegemony 
because it is an exploiting class and then uses the police, allowing the 
working class to bring about expansive hegemony.64 
Gramsci’s theory seems more consonant with the Marxist context in 
China than Huntington’s. His theory was read, discussed, and applied to 
explain and guide government policy. The party and government spoke 
frequently of the cultural issues. In his report at the Sixteenth Party 
Congress held in November 2002, President Jiang Zemin said that China 
should 
[a]ttach equal importance to both material and spiritual civilization and 
run the country by combining the rule of law with the rule of virtue. 
Socialist spiritual civilization is an important attribute of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics. Basing ourselves on China’s realities, we must 
carry forward the fine tradition of our national culture and absorb the 
achievements of foreign cultures in building socialist spiritual 
civilization. We should unceasingly upgrade the ideological and ethical 
 
ANTONIO GRAMSCI READER: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1916-1935, at 189, 211 (David Forgacs ed., 
2000) [hereinafter GRAMSCI READER]. 
 60. See GRAMSCI, supra note 50, at 161. 
 61. See id. at 57–59. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 130–133. 
 64. See GRAMSCI READER, supra note 59, at 189–221. 
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standards as well as the scientific and cultural qualities of the entire 
people so as to provide a strong motivation and intellectual support for 
the modernization drive.65 
The party and the government realized the importance of culture, and 
adopted a two-hand strategy: to ally and regulate. The government keeps 
tight control of ideology and censors the media and internet to block 
subversive dissidents from being heard, while at the same time 
compromising with, absorbing, and supporting other  
 
 
mainstream ideologies, including those of the functional religious 
organizations.66 
C. Religions’ Engagement in Cultural Hegemony 
In order to respond to the hegemonic actions of the government, the 
five major religious organizations all propagate discourses relevant to 
their own doctrines in the name of serving society and promoting 
people’s well-being, reflected in the slogans of these religious 
organizations.67 The “humanistic Buddhism,” coined by Master Taixu in 
the 1920s and elaborated by Zhao Puchu, the former president of the 
Chinese Buddhist Association, has been a common public doctrine in 
modern Chinese Buddhist history. The theology of love, formulated by 
Bishop Ding Guangxun, the former president of the Chinese Christian 
Council, is the working theological thought in China today.68 
As Janice Wickeri, the editor of Bishop Ding’s collected writings 
Love Never Ends, commented, 
Beginning with God as Lover rather than with human beings as sinners 
 
 65. Zemin, supra note 39, at I.5.  
 66. Randy James, A Brief History of: Chinese Internet Censorship, TIME, Mar. 18, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1885961,00.html. 
 67. The slogan of Buddhism is “honor the world and benefit all sentient beings”; the slogan 
of Daoism is “realize divinity through virtuous deeds”; Islam’s slogan is “pray to Allah to have great 
happiness in this life and afterlife”; the slogan of Catholics and Protestants is “glorify God and 
benefit human beings.” The Chinese characters for these slogans are: “庄严国土,利乐有情”； 
“功德成神”； “两世吉庆”； “荣神益人”. The former president of Chinese Christian Council, Ding 
Guangxun, proposed a new theory, which has a name “Love of Theology.” 
 68. K. H. TING, LOVE NEVER ENDS: PAPERS BY K. H. TING (Janice Wickeri, ed., 2000) 
[hereinafter TING, LOVE NEVER ENDS]. Other editions of this book are also available in the United 
States: K. H. TING, GOD IS LOVE: COLLECTED WRITINGS OF BISHOP K. H. TING (2004); K. H. TING, 
A CHINESE CONTRIBUTION TO ECUMENICAL THEOLOGY: SELECTED WRITINGS OF BISHOP K. H. 
TING (Janice & Philip Wickeri eds., 2002) [hereinafter TING, A CHINESE CONTRIBUTION]. 
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marks a significant point of departure for a minority Christianity 
reaching out to the broader society. By making it possible to affirm the 
good found outside the Christian community, this approach offers a 
Christian perspective on the accommodation between Christianity and 
secular society . . . [which] could be very important for the future of the 
church in China, promoting Christian participation in the larger  
 
 
society and unity within a church with strong fundamentalist 
tendencies.69 
The traditional mainstream teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism, 
and Daoism all teach that human beings are born from Dao or Buddha; 
hence human nature is of Dao or Buddha. In other words, human beings 
are originally good or innocent. The Chinese Marxism before the 
reformed era deemed that there is only human nature of classes; no 
human nature can transcend the limitation of its class. Many post-Mao 
Chinese scholars agree that there is a common human nature that is 
universally good.70 Christian teachings that begin with original sin are 
quite exotic in this context. Fundamentalist Christian views preach 
extensively on the distinction between believers and nonbelievers and 
narrow down the purpose of being a Christian to only salvation. These 
views make it very difficult for the minority Christians to get along well 
with mainstream society in China. If instead the emphasis of Christian 
teachings in China was put on God’s love, they would be more 
acceptable to the Chinese population. 
Harmony is a fundamental concept in traditional Chinese philosophy 
and a lofty social ideal that has been cherished by the Chinese people for 
thousands of years. Chinese scholars had discussed concepts relating to 
harmony for decades before President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao 
advocated the “peaceful rise,” “harmonious society,” and “scientific 
development” theories and planned to develop cultural hegemony 
accordingly. President Hu and Premier Wen also extended the ideal of 
harmony to international relationships.71 Chinese religions have played 
 
 69. TING, LOVE NEVER ENDS, supra note 68. 
 70. Huang Nansen (黄楠森), On the Universality and Class Nature of Human Right 
(论人权的普遍性和阶级性), http://www.humanrightschina.org/china/rqzt/zt20020041210 
143916.htm. Professor Huang is a famous Marxist philosopher from Peking University.  
 71. Professor Zhang Liwen (张立文), from Renmin University, Tang Yijie (汤一介) and Xu 
Kangsheng (许抗生), both from Peking University, are prominent proponents of the traditional 
Chinese philosophy of harmony. Professor Zheng Bijian (郑必坚), from Party School of the CCP 
Central Committee, has strong influence on the application of these theories to the hegemonic 
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the role of ambassador of peace in the world for years. They participate 
actively in international religious organizations and provide charity to 
needy people in other countries, such as the victims of the Indonesian 
tsunami. By early February 2005, religious organizations in China had 
donated over tens of millions yuan to tsunami victims, including about 
twelve million yuan (1.5 million US dollars) from the Buddhist 
organizations, which was the largest donation that the Red Cross of 
China received.72 
An international Buddhist forum was hosted on April 13–17, 2006, 
for the first time since Buddhism spread to China over 2,000 years ago.73 
About 1,000 monks and scholars on Buddhism from more than 30 
countries attended the conference in the scenic cities of Hangzhou and 
nearby Zhoushan in eastern Zhejiang province. The theme of the forum 
was “A Harmonious World Begins in the Mind.” Ye Xiaowen said at a 
meeting with the board of the Chinese Buddhist Association in Jiangsu 
province in March 2006, “The ‘harmonious world’ theory . . . will help 
dispel doubts in the international community about China’s continued 
development and refute the absurd China threat theory.”74 “It is desirable 
for Buddhist affairs to help civilian rule.”75 The present director of 
SARA commented that 
[t]he relationship of religion with politics in China, has learned from 
 
discourses. Their sample papers are on file with the author: Zhang, Carry Forward the Harmony 
Culture, and Construct a Harmonious World: the Contemporary Values of Harmony Thought from 
Chinese Tradition (弘扬和谐文化 构建和谐世界———中国传统和谐思想的当代价值); Tang, 
A Modern Annotation of Confucian Harmony Idea (儒家”和谐”思想的现代诠释); Xu, Harmonious 
Society Follows the Way of Dao (和谐社会 法道而行); Zheng, Harmonious Society, an Important 
Theoretical Innovation (和谐社会，又一重大理论创新). 
 72. Chinese Religious Tsunami Relief Donations, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, (Feb. 7, 2005, 
7:02 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/ydyhx/zgys.htm. 
 73. China Supports Buddhism in Building Harmonious World, CHINA RADIO 
INTERNATIONAL (April 13, 2006, 12:29 AM), http://english.cri.cn/811/2006/04/13/ 198@76750.htm; 
First World Buddhist Forum Opens in Hangzhou, CHINA DAILY (April 13, 2006, 10:31 AM), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-04/13/content_ 566998.htm.  
 74. China Hopes Buddhist Forum Will Counter Threat Theory, WORLD WIDE RELIGIOUS 
NEWS (March 27, 2006), http://wwrn.org/articles/20968/?&place=china/taiwan&section= buddhism. 
 75. On February 24, 2006, Ye Xiao gave a speech at the Seventh III International Buddhist 
Forum. The topic was “Make concerted efforts to have a better International Buddhist Forum.” In 
this speech, he stated that the purpose of having the International Buddhist Forum was to help the 
Chinese government to rule people and manage the country. He said, “It is a precious great 
opportunity to come upon this excellent time, we should use Buddhism as a tool to help the 
government to rule and develop this country.” For the whole speech, see 
http://www.wuys.com/paper/wbf/034.asp. A copy is on file with the author: 
齐心协力办好世界佛教论坛. 
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both those of the ancient China and the western countries, but differs 
from them in some ways. It is a new type with its own characteristics 
suited for the Chinese socialism. It takes the separation of church from 
state as its base, while the harmony of church with state as its value 
orientation. That is to say, to insist on the separation principle, and 
form a clear border between the state and church, in case the state 
replaces the church or vice versa. By doing so, we installed system 
security, while do not regard separation as the ultimate end of dealing 
with the relationship. On the contrary, we should realize the 
harmonious relationship between the state and church, and build up 
friendly interaction between them.76 
IV. RESISTANCE AND RESOLUTION 
A. Domestic Resistance and Resolution 
Of course, the elite coalition and cultural hegemony have 
encountered resistance from both domestic and foreign sources. The 
domestic ones are: (1) “the various crimes on the pretext of religion,” 
among which the Islamic extremists of the Eastern Turkistan 
independence movement and Lamaist Splittists of the Tibetan 
independence movement are the most audible; (2) the Xiejiao or 
destructive cults, among which Falun Gong is the most visible;77 (3) the 
dysfunctional religious groups, which neither violate the regulations and 
laws nor join the coalition and hegemony, being commonly called 
“underground churches” in Catholicism and “family gatherings” in 
Protestantism;78 and (4) the peripheral religious elements, including folk 
religious practices and some newly imported religions both for expatriate 
and local believers, which fall beyond the current official definition of 
religion.79 The last category exists as a resistance not because they act 
against the government or are not happy to register; on the contrary, they 
are pushing to get legal status. Furthermore, there are longstanding 
disagreements on their recognition and treatment with anxiety over 
whether a Pandora’s box may be opened if they are recognized. The 
 
 76. Wang Lian, The Current Relationship Between the Chinese Government and Religious 
Groups, STUDY TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009. 
 77. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2004: CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG, AND 
MACAU), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35396.htm. 
 78. The Chinese government does not call them “family churches.” 
 79. See Preeti Bhattacharji, Religion in China, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (May 16, 
2008), http://www.cfr.org/china/religion-china/p16272. 
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greatest  
 
fear is that any religious group could then claim the benefits of official 
recognition and the current policy would fail to continue. 
The government resolves each of these issues in various ways. It 
punishes crimes and Xiejiao (destructive cults) “relentlessly according to 
the law.”80 As to the noncooperative religious groups, there is a gray 
area. It is complicated because there are various motivations for some 
religious groups not being willing to join recognized organizations or 
register with the government: some group leaders are skeptical of the 
policy of religious freedom because of the experiences with the Cultural 
Revolution,81 some have a difficult relationship with the leaders of 
recognized religious organizations,82 and some have their theological 
reasons. For example, a group may be very spiritual and reject 
registration as profane, especially with a government that has an atheist 
ideology.83 The government once was very alert to these groups, but 
time has proven that they do not pose serious dangers to the social 
order.84 Thus, the government neither supports nor tries to disperse them 
as long as they do not challenge the law and order (for example, by 
igniting massive riots). However, these groups naturally have to pay 
some price for their disobedience. One example is that such groups are 
denied legal person status, which is necessary for benefits such as real 
estate ownership and tax exemption.85 
There are widespread folk religious practices in China, including 
ancestor worship, worship of local deities, Feng Shui, fortune telling, and 
other community traditions.86 The official policy is to treat these 
practices as “contradictions within the people.”87 In most cases, publicity 
 
 80. “To punish relentlessly according to law” (依法严惩) is an often-heard newspeak of the 
Chinese government. See generally Kristin Kupfer, Christian-Inspired Groups in the People’s 
Republic of China After 1978: Reaction of State and Party Authorities, 51 SOCIAL COMPASS 273, 
274–76 (2004). 
 81. See Bhattacharji, supra note 79. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Feng Shui Booms in China, BBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2001, 5:31 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1207420.stm. 
 87. This phrase comes from an influential speech by Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong, Chairman of 
the Communist Party of China, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, 
Address before the Eleventh Session (Enlarged) of the Supreme State Conference (Feb. 27, 1957), in 
PEOPLE’S DAILY, June 19, 1957, available at  
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campaigns are used to convince individuals of the error of their ways.88 
In a few cases, where practices are deemed to “bring about damages to 
the property or health of the people,” or to “endanger the national 
security or social order,” the Criminal Code is applied. Thanks to the 
untiring defense of some liberal scholars, the situation is relaxing. In 
2002, the Beijing municipal government announced its latest revision of 
religious regulations and dropped the clause about banned “superstitious 
activities.”89 At the National Religious Work Conference held in January 
2004, the government decided to set up a new unit within SARA to deal 
with folk religions.90 This is a sign that the government is conceding the 
existence of this cultural heritage under the mantle of religious affairs. 
B. Foreign Resistance and Resolution 
The outside challenges come from (1) “the foreign hostile forces” 
who do not like Marxism and the Chinese system of governance and 
hence try to undermine them through the channel of religion; (2) some 
 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-/mswv5_58.htm. Mao 
divided contradictions among the people into two categories: contradictions within the people, or 
domestic social unrest, and those between the enemy and ourselves. The former is compromising 
and can be addressed with peaceful methods but the latter is uncompromising and only can be 
resolved with violent methods.  
 88. BBC NEWS, supra note 86. 
 89. The Chinese constitution states:  
Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state 
organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to 
believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do 
not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may 
make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of 
citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and 
religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination. 
XIANFA art. 36 (1982) (China) (The Chinese characters of this article are: 第三十六条 
中华人民共和国公民有宗教信仰自由。任何国家机关、社会团体和个人不得强制公民信仰宗
教或者不信仰宗教，不得歧视信仰宗教的公民和不信仰宗教的公民。国家保护正常的宗教活
动。任何人不得利用宗教进行破坏社会秩序、损害公民身体健康、妨碍国家教育制度的活动
。宗教团体和宗教事务不受外国势力的支配。). 
 90. DECREE ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS OF BEIJING MUNICIPALITY (北京市宗教事务条例), 
available at http://www.bjethnic.gov.cn/zcfg/PolicyDetail.asp?id= 5289&pos=45. It was years later 
that Chinese media noticed that SARA had set up a new department dealing with folk religion and 
religions other than the five major ones—Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism. 
See State Bureau of Religious Affairs Special Institutions to Manage the New Civil Religion, FUN 
WITH HI (Aug. 3, 2007, 10:18 AM), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4dd11cfa01000ays.html; cf. 
Richard Madsen, The Upsurge of Religion in China, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 58, 61 (2010) (“Yet SARA 
has no jurisdiction over any form of religion that has not received official recognition . . . . [F]olk 
religions are . . . defined  . . . as ‘feudal superstition’ . . . . [And] none of these activities are under the 
purview of SARA.”). 
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foreign religious groups who are “trying to restore their lost dominance 
over Chinese churches;”91 and (3) Western governments (especially the 
government of the United States) and human right organizations, who 
always keep an eye on Chinese religious freedom and try to censure or 
even sanction the Chinese government. 
According to Decree 144 of the State Council and its supplement 
concerning the religious life of foreigners in China,92 foreigners are free 
to join church services but are not allowed to establish religious 
organizations in China. In some metropolitan cities, like Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou, which have significant foreign populations, 
there are registered “temporary venues” for religious services that the 
foreign congregations rent. For example, there are two temporary venues 
for the Protestant congregations of foreigners: one is in the Twenty-First 
Century Hotel in Chaoyang District and the other is in the concert hall of 
the National Library in Haidian District. Both of them are located in a 
central place where the foreign population is dense and can hold more 
than 2,000 people. The Mormon Church also has temporary venues in 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.93 
The government also is refining its policy in hopes that religion can 
cushion the transformations while China enters the WTO and other 
international organizations. The government admits that globalization 
may trigger new waves of foreign religious influence. The religious 
organizations are encouraged to cultivate positive relationships with their 
friendly foreign counterparts while filtering unwanted foreign impacts. 
As Ye Xiaowen stressed, Chinese churches  
must step up their anti-infiltration efforts to block hostile foreign groups 
from establishing footholds in China.94 
 
 91. See Madsen, supra note 90, at 68–70 (discussing the problems of both Catholicism and 
Islam, and China’s attempt to keep both from gaining too much influence). 
 92. The two national regulations on foreigners’ religious activities in China are Decree 144 
of State Council: Regulations on the Management of Religious Activities of Foreigners in China 
(promulgated by the State Council, January 31, 1994),  available at  
http://www.uibe.edu.cn/upload/up_dfs/clxsfg3.htm, and Specific Rules for Implementing the 
Regulations on the Management of Religious Activities of Foreigner in China, available at 
http://sara.gov.cn/GB/zcfg/gz/948ea802-0a1c-11da-9f13-93180af1bb1a.html. 
 93. In order to regulate the religious affairs of the foreigners in China, the State Council 
issued an order, Administration of Religious Activities of Aliens within the Territory of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1994, and its implementing provisions in 2000. Both have function similar to 
law. The full texts are available at http://sara.gov.cn/gb/zcfg/gz/ 20100423-01-948ea802-0a1c-11da-
9f13-93180af1bb1a.html. 
 94. Ye Xiaowen gave a speech at the open ceremony of Seventh Chinese Christian Forum. 
See Xiaowen, supra note 36, at 11–13. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
According to the official representation of the CCP, the Marxism to 
which the Party holds fast is an “incessantly developing Marxism.” 
Marxism has become a useful label for the group in power to legitimize 
their ideology, even though most of its connotations have been replaced. 
Having the largest membership among the world’s political parties at 78 
million, the CCP cannot only represent one or two classes. As its revised 
charter stipulates, the Party is the vanguard team of not only the Chinese 
workers but also the Chinese people and other nationalities.95 No longer 
limiting the class background of its members, the recruiting policy 
emphasizes that target members should be “good at both talent and 
virtue” (“Decai Jianbei”), and opens its door to top college students and 
entrepreneurs. The Party itself is becoming an elite organization. The 
upper layers of this organization attract the upper layers of religious and 
many other circles to form an even larger coalition. It seems that this way 
of governance has been successful so far in sustaining rapid development 
and political stability. 
However, how long can this style of governance sustain itself? There 
are severe challenges behind the great expectations. We are not sure 
how, when, and to what extent these crises can be solved. Even though I 
would like to believe that the elites in power could tackle all problems to 
a satisfactory degree, can we believe that they will be able to keep unity 
within the coalition and make the stage open to more talented, virtuous, 
and ambitious elites? In other words, how can the power of an elite 
coalition keep from degenerating and coagulating in a homogenous inner 
circle? 
It was radical leftists within the CCP that once tried to exterminate 
traditional culture so as to monopolize or “purify” the state ideology. 
Nowadays it seems that the Party is turning back to traditional heritages 
for cultural hegemony. Can an assertive, official ideology be humble and 
honest enough to learn from traditional wisdom that is more than 5,000 
years old? Can Marxism, when combined with traditional culture and 
free market forces, amount to a dominant national cultural system? Only 
time will tell. 
 
 
 95. The Chinese version of the CCP’s new charter is available at 
http://news.ewe.com.cn/show_news.php?blockid=81&articleid=9025.  
